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SEARCHING FOR REMEDIAL PARADIGMS:  







By recognizing the overriding importance of 
civil liberties even in wartime, the Supreme 
Court has . . . [perhaps] learned the lessons of 
our own history -- that especially in wartime, 
the nation depends on independent federal 
courts to guard the liberties of all and to be 





It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely 
that civil liberty will occupy as favored a 
position in wartime as it does in peacetime.  
But it is both desirable and likely that more 
careful attention will be paid by the courts to 
the basis for the government‘s claims of 
necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty.
2
 
   
      Nine years after the unprecedented terrorist attacks on 
September 11, judicial response to various governmental and 
individual methods of combating terrorism remains 
deferential and restrained.  The courts have heard at least 
three types of cases brought by advocates for three distinct 
groups: the alleged perpetrators of terrorism; the victims of 
terrorist attacks; and third party humanitarian groups. Implicit 
in the practical question of how to deal effectively with 
                                                          

  Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law at 
Dartmouth. 
1
  GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM, 556 note 
(W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. 2004) (quoting Fred Korematsu‘s 
response to the Guantanamo Bay and Hamdi decisions). 
2
  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME, 224-25 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998). 
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terrorism is the broader consideration which Congress, the 
President and others must also address: how to respond to the 
terrorists‘ extreme human rights violations without violating 
international human rights norms and international 
humanitarian law.               
      In the courts, most attention has focused on the cases 
brought to vindicate the rights of detainees as alleged 
perpetrators of terrorism.  Government military policies 
responding to terrorism include prolonged detention of 
―enemy combatants‖ with restricted habeas corpus access and 
a trial process in military commissions.  Historically, during 
times of crisis, the federal government uses various control 
mechanisms (however ill conceived) to suppress activities 
deemed threatening to national security.  A brief survey of 
recent cases in Part I will demonstrate that the Supreme Court 
has ruled haltingly but decisively to assure that the detainees 
receive due process rights afforded by the Constitution while, 
at the same time, protecting the government‘s  national 
security interests.           
      A second group of cases are those brought to compensate 
victims of terrorism.  These cases stem from earlier acts of 
terrorism, the Iran Hostage Event, the SS Cole Attack, but 
also include suits by victims of the 2001 attack.  Congress 
and the Executive have provided methods of compensating 
the victims and increased the terror victims‘ ability to file 
civil suits against terrorist perpetrators.  Seen as an effective 
deterrent to terrorism by making those who fund terrorist 
activities pay for their involvement, the cases are 
intermittently welcomed by the government.  A discussion of 
the current commentary endorsing this approach illustrates 
that this remedial paradigm is gaining in importance. 
Statutes restricting communication and material support 
to government-designated foreign terrorist organizations have 
spawned a third group of cases, brought by third parties to 
protect free speech and association rights of individuals and 
organizations adversely affected by the laws.  In the 2009-
2010 term, for the first time, the Supreme Court heard one of 
these cases, Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. Eric H. 
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Holder, Jr.
3
 (hereinafter  ―HLP, et al‖).  The decision ended 
a twelve year litigation pursued by two citizens and six 
organizations who challenged the material-support provisions 
of the Patriot Act, initially passed within days of the 9/11 
terrorist attack.  A close review of the opinions in HLP, et al 
exemplifies again the cautious and deferential role espoused 
by the judiciary.    
In each line of cases, the plaintiffs argue for a different 
remedial solution to the evils of terrorism.  Terrorist acts, 
which either target or incidentally kill innocent civilians, are 
a profound violation of human rights law, recognized on both 
the municipal and international level, a fact also recognized 
by the plaintiffs in all of the cases, even though terrorist 
methods are often justified as a means to principled ends.  
Congress and the Executive enacted various measures in the 
wake of September 11 to counteract threatened terrorists‘ 
attacks.  Retaliatory and preventative action was 
comprehensive.
4
  When the United States government 
responded to terrorism with policies which arguably violate 
civil rights and human rights norms, civil liberties advocates 
argued that these policies must be changed to afford 
constitutional due process protections. Victims of terrorist 
activities and their advocates, by seeking damages from the 
perpetrators, strike at the financial viability of terrorist 
groups. Non-governmental groups, dedicated to enforcing 
human rights, focus on defeating terrorism by informing and 
educating the perpetrators in nonviolent methods of achieving 
their principled goals.  These groups seek unrestricted access 
to communicate with the alleged terrorists and offer to the 
terrorists solutions which do not violate human rights. 
 
                                                          
3
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. (2010); 130 S.Ct. 
2705 (2010). 
4
  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center on the Administration of 
Criminal Law in Support of Eric Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al. at 4, 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-
1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 5177141.  ―Preventing terrorism requires 
thwarting plots and starving terrorist organizations of the resources 
necessary to fund their violent missions.  All elements of national power, 
including federal criminal law, contribute to this effort.‖  
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I.  PROLONGED DETENTION AND THE WRIT 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, the 
Supreme Court decided four major cases
5
 within a period of 
four years involving the rights of captured detainees, ―enemy 
combatants,‖ being held indefinitely without being given the 
constitutional due process rights regularly afforded the 
criminally accused under the Constitution.  Immediately after 
September 11, the President and Congress implemented a 
national defense strategy to punish the alleged terrorists and 
to prevent future terrorist attacks.  Exercising shared war 
powers given to them by the Constitution, the two branches 
of government worked in tandem to secure the nation.  Most 
notable for purposes of judicial review were the military 
commissions set up to try the detainees. 
Within a few days of the September 11 attack, Congress 
passed the Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (hereinafter ―AUMF‖)
6
 empowering the 
President to  use ―all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . 
. .‖
7
 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an 
executive order
8
 setting up military tribunals to try non-
United States citizens accused of terrorism.  The President 
specifically noted that for the ―safety of the United States and 
the nature of international terrorism . . . it is not practicable to 
apply in military commissions under this order the principles 
of law and rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial 
of criminal cases in the United States district courts.‖
9
  The 
order further provided that the terms of detention would be 
                                                          
5
  The first of the cases, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) was 
followed the same year by Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) was heard two years later and 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) was heard two years after 
Hamdan.    
6
   AUMF, S.J.Res. 23, 107
th
 Congr.  See 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a) (2001). 
The resolution was issued pursuant to the War Powers Resolution of 
1973. 
7
   Id. 
8
   Exec. Order, No. 57833, 66 C.F.R. 57833 (2001). 
9
   Id. 
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prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.
10
  These two events 
effectively set in motion the debate over civil liberties that 
would dominate the next decade and bring to the Supreme 
Court the prolonged detention cases beginning with Rasul v. 




As early as March of 2002, Professor Ruth Wedgewood
12
 
of Yale University School of Law, speaking at the University 
of Illinois in Champaign, Illinois, in defense of the military 
commissions, was met by protestors organized by University 
of Illinois law professor Francis Boyle who described the 
courts as ―un-American‖ ―kangaroo courts.‖
13
  The debate 
was quickly taken to the federal courts in cases brought by 
the detainees seeking to contest detention under the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution. 
A brief look at the detainee cases will reveal that the 
Supreme Court was divided in the decisions, showed 
deference to the two branches of government given war 
powers by the Constitution, and, accordingly, made case by 
case decisions conscious of a framework of shared 
government powers.  The Supreme Court decided the first 
detainee case, Rasul v. Bush,
14
 in 2004.  The petitioner was 
an alien captured in Afghanistan being held at Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base in Cuba.  The majority opinion by Justice 
Stevens found that habeas corpus relief would extend 
extraterritorially to the prisoners held at the United States 
military base, that the habeas statute confers a right to judicial 
review of the legality of executive detention of aliens in ―a 
territory over which the United States exercises plenary and 
                                                          
10
  Id. at 57834.   
11
  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008). 
12
  Professor Wedgewood ―helped draft proposals‖ for the military 
tribunal and emphasized in response to probing questions that ―the United 
States court system [could] not adapt to the terrorist situation.‖  Alina 
Dizik, U. Ill. Speaker Defends Military Tribunals, U-Wire, 2002 WL 
16985298, Mar. 29, 2002.  
13
  Id. 
14
  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‗ultimate sovereignty.‘‖
15
  
Writing for Justices Roberts and Thomas, Justice Scalia 
would not extend the protection of the writ to aliens held 
―outside the sovereign borders of the United States and 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of all its courts.‖
16
  Justice 
Scalia decries the majority holding as a ―wrenching departure 
from precedent.‖
17
 Insisting that by ―abandoning the 
venerable statutory line drawn in Eisentrager, the court 
boldly extends the scope of the habeas statute to the four 
corners of the earth.‖
18
   
In the same year the Court heard Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
19
 a 
case brought by a United States‘ citizen captured in 
Afghanistan, being held as an ―enemy combatant‖ within the 
United States.  Yasar Esam Hamdi was born in Louisiana in 
1980 but was living in Afghanistan in 2001 when he was 
captured.
20
  The Court found that a ―citizen-detainee seeking 
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must 
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a 
fair opportunity to rebut the Government‘s factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker.‖
21
  O‘Connor, speaking for a 
plurality that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer, thought the fact that habeas corpus had 
not been suspended assured the citizen-detainee a ―fair 
hearing‖ before some ―neutral decisionmaker,‖ but to others 
on the Court, the citizen-detainee was entitled to release.
22
   
                                                          
15
  Id. at 475. 
16
  Id. at 488. 
17
  Id. at 505. 
18
  Id. at 498. 
19
  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
20
  Id. at 510. 
21
  Id. at 532. 
22
  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 541 Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment reasoned that the 
detention was unauthorized and that Hamdi should be released. Scalia, J., 
joined by Stevens, J., dissenting, reasoned that the law of war could not be 
applied under the open court doctrine (id. citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2 (1866) and noted that the court should grant the writ to Hamdi, 
after which time, ―the Executive may then hand him over to the criminal 
authorities, whose detention for the purpose of prosecution will be lawful, 
or else must release him.‖ (quoting Id. at 576) Scalia, J., dissenting, faults 
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Justice Thomas, dissenting, thought the question of 
Hamdi‘s lawful detention came to ―the Court with the 
strongest presumptions in favor of the Government.‖
23
  He 
concluded that ―the Government‘s detention of Hamdi as an 
enemy combatant‖ was entitled to deference as the 
―President, in the prosecution of a war and authorized by 
Congress, has acted well within his authority[,]‖ and that 
Hamdi ―received all the process to which he was due . . .  .‖
24
  
Although Justice O‘Connor boldly stated that ―a state of 
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to 
the rights of the Nation‘s citizens,‖
25
 she also recognized the 
sources that limited that power, ―unless Congress acts to 
suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the 
Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this 
delicate balance of governance, serving as an important 
judicial check on the Executive‘s discretion in the realm of 
detentions.‖
26
  The dialogue between the branches of 
government is evidenced by the action taken by Congress and 
the Executive in response to the two cases decided in 2004.  
The Secretary of Defense, in July of 2004, created a review 
process by which detainees could contest their enemy-
combatant status before a Combat Status Review Tribunal 
(hereinafter ―CSRT‖) and Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act (hereinafter ―DTA‖) which restricted review 
of CSRT‘s rulings to procedural regularity issues and 
channeled appeals to the D.C. Circuit.
27
  
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
28
 the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that the detainees were entitled to habeas corpus relief.  The 
case was decided by a 5-3 majority, as Chief Justice Roberts, 
having heard the case below, recused.  Salim Ahmed 
Hamdan, being held since 2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
                                                                                                                       
the majority for ―remediation of executive default,‖ insisting that the ―role 
of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of executive detention, not to 
supply the omitted process necessary to make it legal.‖ Id. 
23
  Id. at 594.  
24
  Id. 
25
  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
26
  Id. 
27
  See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572-73 (2006). 
28
  Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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was a Yemeni national captured abroad.  He contested the 
procedures provided by the military commission court.  The 
Supreme Court overturned the jurisdiction stripping 
provisions of the DTA and found that the military 
commissions procedures violated Article 36 of  Uniform 
Code of Military Justice  (hereinafter ―UCMJ‖) which 
requires that military commission procedures be equivalent to 
the procedures followed in courts martial.
29
  Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, outlined the military commissions 
procedures.
30
  He noted that the ―accused and his civilian 
counsel may be excluded from and precluded from ever 
hearing what evidence was presented . . . [if] either the 
Appointing Authority or the presiding officer decide to 
‗close‘‖; that ―any evidence‖ can be admitted that, ―in the 
opinion of the presiding officer ‗would have probative value 
to a reasonable person‘‖; and that ―neither live testimony nor 
witnesses‘ written statements need be sworn.‖
31
The Court 
also found that the procedures violated the requirements of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
32
 which 
Article 21 of the UCMJ recognizes as mandatory for military 
commissions under the laws of war.
33
   
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, however, dissented.  
Each wrote a separate dissent with one common thread, the 
need to defer to the other branches of government.  The 
dissenters would have granted the Government‘s request for 
abstention, citing ―considerations of inter-branch comity at 
the federal level [that] weigh heavily against our exercise of 
equity jurisdiction in this case . . . [exercise of which] brings 
the Judicial Branch into direct conflict with the Executive in 
an area where the Executive‘s competence is maximal and 
ours is virtually non-existent.‖
34
 Scalia would also have 
upheld the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the DTA which 
                                                          
29
  Id. at 617-20. 
30
  Id. at 613-15. 
31
  Id. at 614. 
32
  Id. at 625.  See also id. at 625-36, for full discussion. 
33
  Id. at 628. The Geneva Conventions are part of the law of war, and 
―compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority 
[for military commissions] set forth in Article 21 is granted.‖ 
34
  Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 676-77 (2006).  
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provided that ―[n]o court, justice or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detainee by the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.‖
35
  He 
reasoned that the provision did not violate the Suspension 
Clause because ―. . . it is clear that Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is 
outside the sovereign ‗territorial jurisdiction‘ of the United 
States . . . [and that p]etitioner, an enemy alien detained 
abroad, has no rights under the Suspension Clause.‖
36
 And 
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, continued the theme by 
arguing that ―the President‘s decision to try Hamdan before a 




As if to invite more dialogue among the branches of 
government, Justice Breyer noted in his short concurrence, 
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, that nothing 
―prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek 
the authority he believes necessary.‖ 
38
 And Justice Kennedy, 
speaking for Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, was more 
explicit, ―In light of the conclusion that the military 
commissions at issue are unauthorized, Congress may choose 
to provide further guidance in this area. Congress, not the 
Court, is the branch in the better position to undertake the 
‗sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent 
with the national interest or with international justice.‘‖
39
  
Post-Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions 
Act (hereinafter ―MCA‖)
40
 which would be tested in the next 
case to come before the Court, Boumediene, et al v. Bush, et 
al.
41
Multiple aliens, detained as enemy combatants, presented 
the question, inter alia, of whether the detainees ―have the 
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus‖
42
 as guaranteed by 
the Suspension Clause. The Court, having resolved habeas 
                                                          
35
  Id. at 656. See also DTA, §1005 (e)(1), 119 Stat. 2742 (2005).  
36
  Id. at 670. 
37
  Id. at 680. 
38
  Id. at 636.  
39
  Id. at 655. 
40
  MCA, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  
41
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
42
  Id. at 732. 
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questions in the previous cases by statutory analysis, 
answered the Constitutional question in the affirmative.
43
  In 
a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia wrote separate 
dissents joined by each other and Justices Thomas and Alito.  
The majority ruled that the DTA procedures were not an 
adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus,
44
 and that 




Justice Kennedy specifically noted the ―ongoing dialogue 
between and among the branches of Government‖ and 
recognized that Congressional passage of the MCA was in 
direct response to the Hamdan decision.
46
 Although holding 
that the detainees could directly seek the writ of habeas 
corpus in federal district courts without exhausting the 
remedies in the DTA and the CRST process,
47
 he stressed 
that, after the decision, the ―outer boundaries of war powers 
[are left] undefined‖ and that the ―political branches . . . can 
engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve 
constitutional values while protecting the Nation from 
terrorism.‖
48
  As the majority did not invalidate the 
procedures contained in the DTA and the MCA, except for § 
7 of the MCA, it left intact the remedial paradigms in those 
provisions
49
 and opened up federal jurisdiction with 
procedures to be designed by the district courts.  Noting that 
the majority did not attempt ―to offer a comprehensive 
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for 
habeas corpus,‖
50
 Justice Kennedy did identify two attributes 
of an acceptable habeas review; the privilege must entitle the 
―prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he 
                                                          
43
  Id. at 733. 
44
  Id. at 734. 
45
  Id. at 792.  MCA § 7 ―denies the federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
habeas corpus actions pending at the time of its enactment.‖  Id. at 736. 
46
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008).  
47
  Id. at 795. 
48
  Id. at 797-98. 
49
  Id. at 795. 
50
  Id. at 779. 
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is being held pursuant to ‗the erroneous application or 
interpretation‘ of relevant law‖ and ―the habeas court must 
have the power to order the conditional release of an 
individual unlawfully detained-though release need not be the 
exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case 
in which the writ is granted.‖
51
 The Court further noted that 
more procedural protection might be required depending on 
the circumstances.
52
     
To the dissenters, the majority did not define an 
alternative effective habeas review, leaving ―open the distinct 
possibility that its ‗habeas‘ remedy will, when all is said and 
done, end up looking a great deal like the DTA review it 
rejects.‖
53
 Chief Justice Roberts, for the dissenters, defended 
the process created by the Congressional acts,
54
 insisting that 
―the system that the political branches constructed adequately 
protects any constitutional rights aliens captured abroad and 
detained as enemy combatants may enjoy.‖
55
 Justice Scalia 
wrote separately to point out the ―legal errors‖ in the Court‘s 
opinion and to note, as before, that ―The writ of habeas 
corpus does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad . 




The Supreme Court, in the detainee cases, gave the alien 
detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus.  The implementation of 
that right for each detainee remains unresolved.  The 
decisions significantly reveal that the search for remedial 
paradigms continues and is, in fact, an inter-branch search. 
Professor Aziz Z. Huq of Chicago University Law 
School, using admittedly limited empirical data,
57
 critically 
                                                          
51
  Id.  
52
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008).  
53
  Id. at 825. 
54
  Id. at 803-809. 
55
  Id. at 802-803. 
56
  Id. at 827. 
57
  For the years, 2002-2009, Huq studied the trends in detainee 
population at Guantanamo Bay. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas, 
Vol. 26 No. 3, Const. Comment, 385 Summer 2010, at 402. He 
documented the yearly population of detainees including the transfers and 
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analyzed the effect of the decisions.
58
  Using the two-fold 
purpose of habeas review advanced by Justice Kennedy in 
Boumediene, he attempted to define the impact the decisions 
had on (1) the personal liberty of the detainees and (2) the 
establishment of legal boundaries on executive detention 
policy.
59
  He concluded that in relation to meaningful habeas 
review, the ―net result of Boumediene . . . was to leave the 
substantive law of executive detention incrementally murkier 
than before.‖ In relation to the Executive‘s legal position, he 
found that ―Boumediene did not prompt any substantial 
change.‖
60
  The data supported Professor Huq‘s conclusion 
that the Hamdi and Rasul decisions had the indirect effect of 
―nudg[ing] the Executive into more wholesale 
reconsideration of detainee processing.‖
61
  This indirect effect 
finding supports the inter-branch dialogue the Justices 
encouraged in the opinions. 
 
II.  CIVIL DAMAGES FOR TORT VICTIMS 
Debra M. Strauss, in a recent law review article,
62
 
predicted that civil lawsuits brought by victims against 
terrorists and their supporters, encouraged by the Justice for 
Victims of Terrorism Act (hereinafter ―JVTA‖) passed in 
January of 2008, would increase. She explained the rationale 
for the second line of cases: 
 
As the judgments from the civil lawsuits 
build, the United States is well on its way to 
                                                                                                                       
releases, id. at 403; compared the population trends at Guantanamo Bay 
with population trends at Bagram, id. at 404-405; and compared habeas 
releases before and after the Boumediene decision. 
58
  Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas, Vol. 26, No. 3, Const. 
Comment, 385 Summer 2010.  
59
  Id. at 385, 395. 
60
  Id. at 412. 
61
  Id. at 427. 
62
  Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: 
Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L. L. 307 (2008-2009).  Debra Strauss, a 
graduate of Yale University School, is Assistant Professor of Business 
Law, Fairfield University, Charles F. Dolan School of Business. 
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combating terrorism through this novel and 
different - nonmilitary approach, whereby 
one can compensate the victims of terrorism 
and at the same time potentially deplete the 





 Although ―progress to date is just the beginning,‖
64
 
Professor Strauss envisioned a global financial war on 
terrorism which includes enforcement of civil judgments by a 
―three pronged approach:‖   
 
First, the Security Council should increase its 
enforcement of members‘ effort to freeze 
assets overseas. . . . Second, the national 
courts of member states should commit to the 
enforcement of the civil judgments of U.S. 
courts for the victims of terrorism, levying 
upon the assets of organizations connected to 
terrorism wherever they may be found. . . . 
Finally, international courts should exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction in these matters, 
enabled by their potential access to the frozen 
assets of terrorists organizations . . . [and] 
should provide terrorism victims with access 





Professor Strauss proposed a global effort with ―[s]trict 
enforcement of [U.N.] resolutions accented by the seizure of 
financial assets and the use of the international judicial 
system [as] the most effective, logical and realistic 
approach.‖
66
  She noted that the 1566 Working Group of the 
Security Council ―already appears to be exploring an 
international compensation fund for the victims‖ and 
                                                          
63
  Id. at 310. 
64
  Id. at 355. 
65
  Id. at 352-53. 
66
  Id. at 354-55. 
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suggested that the Group might ―provide an independent 
avenue for victims of international terrorism to pursue civil 
lawsuits against terrorist groups and state sponsors of 
terrorism in international courts.‖
67
  Throughout the article, 
Professor Strauss stresses that the international community 
shares a strong commitment to fight terrorism and that there 
is a demonstrated common goal to wage a civil battle.  She 
concluded that ―it is only through the active role of the UN 
and other organizations, including the courts worldwide, that 
the international community can bring to fruition this struggle 
to reclaim the world from the clutches of terrorism.‖
68
 
In an earlier article,
69
 Professor Strauss surveyed the 
cases in the United States brought under the various acts
70
 
provided by Congress to facilitate suing terrorists and state 
sponsors of terrorism.
71
  Most notable is the terrorist 
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
72
  This 
                                                          
67
  Id. at 353.  See id. at 339-53, for a more complete understanding 
of the efforts made by the United Nations in this area.  But see Eric 
Rosand, The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist 
Terrorism: Is a Global Counter-Terrorism Body Needed? 11 J. CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY L. 399 (2006) for a critical analysis of the work of the 
United Nations and an alternative proposal for combating terrorism. 
68
  Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: 
Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L. L. 307, 355 (2008-2009). 
69
  Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front:  
Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups 
Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 682 (2005).  
70
  In addition to common law tort actions available in every state, the 
federal statutes allow plaintiffs to seek civil redress.  See the Alien Tort 
Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948); the Torture Victim Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a)(1)-(2), 106 Stat. 73 (1993), reprinted in 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 note (West 1993); the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7) [amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996]; and the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 
U.S.C.§ 2333. 
71
  Strauss, supra note 69 at 683-725. 
72
  Traditionally, sovereign immunity was absolute.  There are now 
several exceptions to the sovereign immunity concept as expressed in the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1602 et seq.; See also 
Portnoy, Aryeh S. et al., ―The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2008 
Year in Review‖ 16 L. BUS. RAM. 179, 180-83. 
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exception parallels the worldwide recognition in human 
rights law that a country cannot mistreat its own subjects or 
others with impunity. Professor Strauss proposed an 
aggregate model of litigation, using simultaneously the 
various remedies available to victims.
73
   She also outlined 
the obstacles faced by victims when seeking to execute on 
judgments,
74
 an issue addressed more fully in the 2009 
article.   
The two articles, taken together, provide a comprehensive 
alternative method of holding perpetrators of terrorism 
accountable, and, at the same time, compensating victims of 
terrorism for losses sustained by the victims themselves, their 
families, and others adversely affected.  The effectiveness of 
the civil damage approach is validated by the lawsuits filed 
against terrorist groups, the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan 
Nations, by the Southern Poverty Law Center.
75
  Huge 
damage awards successfully disabled the terrorists‘ activities.  
Morris Dees, co-founder and chief legal counsel for the 
Southern Poverty Law Center, vividly recounted the events 
surrounding the first of these verdicts and his satisfaction 
upon hearing of the jury award in 1987.  He noted, with 
words optimistic for this line of cases, ―History would show 
that an all-white Southern jury had held the Klan accountable 
after all these years.‖
76
  
Illustrating, however, the political and judicial hurdles 
faced by 9/11 victims in their attempts to hold terrorist state 
supporters accountable, the United States Supreme Court 
recently refused to hear an appeal in In re Terrorist Attacks 
on September 11, 2001.
77
 The decision effectively upheld the 
                                                          
73
  Strauss, supra note 69 at 739-41. 
74
  Id. at 724-38. 
75
  See id., n.7 at 742, for a discussion of cases filed in Ala., S.C., and 
Idaho, in which the Southern Poverty Center was awarded damages 
ranging from 6.3 million to 37.8 million dollars. 
76
  MORRIS DEES WITH STEVE FIFFER, A SEASON FOR JUSTICE: THE 
LIFE AND TIMES OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER, at 330 (1992).  See Donald v. 
United Klans of Am., No. 84-0725-AH (N.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 1987). 
77
  In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); aff‘d 538 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir. 2008); cert. denied Federal 
Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009). 
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lower court‘s ruling that Saudi Arabia was immune from the 
civil suit filed by 6000 plaintiffs- relatives of victims killed in 
the attack, injured victims and business and governmental 
entities.
78
  Although state sponsors of terrorism can be sued 
directly under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
exception, only Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria are presently on 
the list of state sponsors.
79
  Daniel L. Byman, Senior Foreign 
Policy Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 
criticized the listings of state sponsors as a ―flawed policy‖ 
and an ―artifact of bad list management,‖ noting that the list 
is outdated and does not reflect current reality at any point in 
time.
80
 Despite the fact that victims‘ suits face formidable 
challenges, including sovereign immunity,
81
 Professor 
Strauss, after analyzing case precedents in the area, 
concluded that this remedial paradigm is a viable option.  The 
cases show that civil damages are being awarded by the 
courts against terrorists and their supporters.
82
 Global 
enforcement of the awards envisioned in the Strauss plan 
would accomplish the ―ultimate goal of these lawsuits . . . to 
access and drain terrorist funds.‖
83
 
III.  MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES 
After numerous hearings and rulings in the lower federal 
court system, the consolidated cases in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (hereinafter, ―HLP et al‖) reached 
the Supreme Court last term.
84
  When the decision was 
                                                          
78
  See Supreme Court: 9/11 Victims Can‘t Sue Saudi Arabia, 




  See Andrew Selman, A Guide on: The List of State Sponsors of 
Terrorism (June 11, 2010), www.kela.org/SPOTGuide.pdf.  
80
  See Daniel L. Byman, The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship 
of Terrorism (May 2008), 
www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/05_terrorism_byman.aspx. 
81
  Strauss supra note 69. 
82
  Id. at 683 et seq. 
83
  Strauss supra note 62, at 310. 
84
  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2713-16 
(2010) for Roberts, C.J. recounting the circuitous procedural history of the 
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announced on June 21, 2010, Justice Breyer, to emphasize the 
importance of the dissent, read the minority opinion from the 
Bench. The Court heard HLP, et al as an applied pre-
enforcement claim for declaratory judgment brought under 18 
U.S.C. §2339 B (a)(1), the material-support provisions of the 
statute
85
  A six judge majority opinion written by Chief 
Justice Roberts decided the case in favor of the government,
86
 
while a three judge dissent authored by Justice Breyer argued 
for remand and non-constitutional review.
87
 
 The petitioners‘ constitutional claims and their 
involvement with terrorist organizations are similar.  The 
Humanitarian Law Project
88
 and its president, Ralph Fertig,
89
  
                                                                                                                       
two cases which were consolidated at the District Court level.  During the 
pendency of the cases, initially filed in 1998, the statute was amended to 
clarify the terms which HLP contends are still unconstitutionally vague.  
85
  18 U.S.C. § 2339B, enacted in 1996 as the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); revised in 2001 as part of the 
Patriot Act; and revised again in 2004 as part of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).  The applicable section reads:  
 
―Whoever knowingly provides material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts 
or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the 
death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for a 
term of years or for life.  To violate this paragraph, a 
person must have knowledge that the organization is a 
designated terrorist organization . . . , that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity 
. . . , or that the organization has engaged or engages in 
terrorism.‖  
 
See id. at 2713 n.1. 
86
  Id. at 2712-31 (Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., 
joined Roberts‘, C.J., opinion).  
87
  Id. at 2731-43 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, J.J., joined Breyer, J. 
dissenting). 
88
  Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1208 
(1998) (describing the Humanitarian Law Project as a nongovernmental 
organization formed in 1985 to ―promote peaceful resolutions of conflict 
by using international human rights law and humanitarian law.‖ The 
group has consultative status at the United Nations and is active 
worldwide.).  
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filed its claim when Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 
1997 designated
90
 the organization, the Kurdistan Workers‘ 
Party (Paritya Karkeran Kurdestan, hereinafter ―PKK‖)
91
 a 
foreign terrorist organization (hereinafter ―DFTO‖).  
Simultaneously with the filing of the suit, HLP ceased 
communicating with and assisting the PKK,
92
 while awaiting 
                                                                                                                       
89
  See generally Adam Liptak, Right to Free Speech Collides With 
Fight Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010,  available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/us/11law.html?_r=1&ref=usapatriot
act (describing Ralph Fertig as a 79 year old civil rights lawyer, and a  
―freedom fighter,‖ who was arrested in 1961 in Selma, Alabama).   In a 
recent interview by the New York Times, he claims that the current climate 
is ―more dangerous than McCarthyism,‖ explaining that communists 
during the McCarthy era were ostracized whereas ―[t]oday, the same 
person would be thrown in jail.‖  (A version of this article appeared in 
print on Feb. 11, 2010, on page A18 of the New York edition.) Advocates 
for the victims also drew parallels, ―AEDPA‘s ban on ‗assistance‘ and 
‗advice‘ is essentially no different from the McCarthy Era attempt to root 
out association with and advocacy for groups unpopular with the 
government,‖ explaining that ―although few individuals were ultimately 
prosecuted under the McCarthy Era laws, thousands were persecuted.‖  
The Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act ―made it a crime 
to associate with . . . designated groups or to speak in support of these 
groups.‖ Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Victims of the McCarthy Era in 
Support of Humanitarian Law Project, et al., 2-3, Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 4074857. 
90
  8 U.S.C. §§ 1189 (a)(1), (4)(B) (2004) (authorizing the Executive 
to identify and designate foreign terrorist organizations, known as 
DFTOs. The law provides for any organization, so designated, to contest 
the designation); HLP, supra note 88, at 310 (explaining that the PKK did 
not contest the designation, but the LTTE did so, unsuccessfully). 
91
  The PKK was established in 1970 and, since the mid 1980‘s, has 
pushed to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey.  In 
1984, the group representing approximately 15% of the Turkish 
population launched its struggle against the government of Turkey using 
terrorist tactics.  See also Gabriel Gatehouse, Seeking Out the PKK 
Gunmen in Iraq's Remote Mountains, BBC, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10703204 (reporting that 
since 1984, more than 40,000 people had been killed.  The group has 
―used the inaccessible mountains of northern Iraq as a base from which to 
plan and execute attacks inside Turkey.‖).  
92
  See Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al., at 10, 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-
1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3865433, for claim that HLP had been ―assisting 
the PKK by training them to bring human rights complaints to the United 
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court determination that its communications with the 
organization were not criminally proscribed by the material-
support provisions of §2339 B.
93
   Nagalingam Jeyalingan, 
MD, a Tamil-American, and five nonprofit groups whose 
activities support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(hereinafter ―LTTE‖), filed a separate but similar action.
94
      
As two of the thirty groups listed as DFTOs in 1997, both 
the PKK and the LTTE represent liberation movements 
seeking to establish autonomous states for minorities.  The 
PKK are fighting to establish an independent Kurdish state in 
the southeastern portion of Turkey, and the LTTE to establish 
a homeland for the Tamils in the northeast portion of Sri 
Lanka.  Within Sri Lanka, the Tamil sympathizers were 
aiding persons of Tamil descent in their struggle against the 
ruling powers in Sri Lanka.
95
  The LTTE ostensibly ceased 
activities within Sri Lanka when it was defeated in 2009.
96
  
                                                                                                                       
Nations, advocating on their behalf and assisting them in peace 
negotiations.‖   
93
  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) 
(according to the material-support provisions, ―a person or organization is 
prohibited from providing any property, tangible or intangible, or service, 
including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . 
. and transportation, except medicine or religious materials‖). 
94
  For a complete description of the parties and organizations 
represented in the case, see Humanitarian Law Project, et al. v. John 
Ashcroft, et al., Case No.: CV 03-6107 ABC (MCx), Order re: Plaintiffs‘ 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Motion to Dismiss, filed 
Jan. 22, 2004, United States District Court, Central District of California, 
at pages 8-11. Nagalingam Jeyalingan, a physician, was born in Sri Lanka 
and is a naturalized citizen. He is described as a ―surgeon with specialized 
training in otolaryngology,‖ at 9, available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news. 
95
   See The History of the Tamil Tigers, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2008.  The LTTE was reported to have 
an international network with branches in over 54 countries (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2010). 
96
   Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2716-17 
(2010).  See majority opinion, id. at 2716-17.  Sri Lankan President 
Mahinda Rajapaska declared victory over the insurgents in May of 2009 
ending the 26 year civil war struggle to create an independent Tamil 
Eelam state in the northern and eastern part of Sri Lanka.  The separatist 
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After 2009, the LTTE continues as a ―political organization 
outside Sri Lanka advocating for the rights of the Tamils.‖
97
  
The petitioners wished to continue engaging with the PKK 
and the LTTE by supporting the lawful, nonviolent political 
advocacy activities in which both engage.
98
     
The narrow holding of the opinion was prefigured by the 
nature of the relief sought. The fact that the case was heard 
under the criminal sanctions of the Patriot Act as a pre-
enforcement, pre-prosecution, as applied action for 
declaratory judgment necessitated a narrow holding.
99
  
Accordingly, Roberts applied the material-support provisions 
to the ―particular speech‖ plaintiffs proposed to undertake: 
 
(1) train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to 
use humanitarian and international law to 
peacefully resolves disputes, (2) teach[ing] 
PKK members how to petition various 
representative bodies such as the United 
Nations for relief, (3) engag[ing] in political 
advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in 
Turkey, and (4) engag[ing] in political 
                                                                                                                       
group LTTE was organized in 1976 and launched its first major attack in 
1983, enjoyed varying degrees of success, using guerrilla war and terrorist 
tactics until the 2009 defeat. See Sengupta, Somini and Seth Mydans, 
Rebels Routed in Sri Lanka after 25 Years of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 
2009, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia. See also 
Anderson, Jon, Lee, Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka‘s brutal military 
victory over the Tamil insurgents, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, 
available at www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011. 
97
   Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2716. 
98
   Id. (discussing that prior to the LTTE‘s defeat, they had trained 
the group to seek tsunami aid from international bodies and to help them 
negotiate peace agreements with the Sri Lankan government, these 
activities ceased when the group was defeated). 
99
   See id. at 2731 (The majority opinion states ―We hold that, in 
regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to 
foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective 
consistent with the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.‖).             
.  
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advocacy on behalf of the Tamils who live in 
Sri Lanka. 
100
   
 
 The petitioners, human rights advocates, contend that 
their free speech and association rights are infringed if they 
cannot continue working with the DFTOs.  They emphasized 
that the two groups represent victims of human rights abuses, 
―the Kurds in Turkey, an ethnic minority subjected to 
substantial discrimination and human rights violations‖ and 
the ―Tamils in Sri Lanka, ―another ethnic minority that has 
been subjected to human rights abuse and discrimination.‖
101
  
The human rights advocates insisted that their engagement 
with the DFTOs involved a ―broad range of lawful activities‖ 
unconnected with terrorist activity.   
 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on February 23, 
2010 and delineated the reasoning that would eventually 
resonate in the majority and minority opinions. Justice 
Roberts clarified the two constitutional challenges by HLP, et 
al to § 2339B of the statute.
102
  By criminalizing their 
material support activities to the PKK and LTTE, the statute 
violated free speech and association rights guaranteed under 
the First Amendment.   The Supreme Court must also 
determine whether the terms - training, personnel service and 
expert advice or assistance - defined as proscribed material 
support in §2339(b)(1) were unconstitutionally vague.
103
   
 HLP, et al argued that the statute was vaguely drafted and 
deprived them and other similar groups of due process under 
the Fifth Amendment as well as infringing their rights of free 
expression and association under the First Amendment.  The 
governments argued that the terms, which has been amended 
and explained by Congress, were not vague but gave 
adequate notice of what constituted punishable conduct under 
the statute.  Persons are clearly prohibited from engaging in 
                                                          
100
  See id. at 2729 (excluding the two that had become moot during 
the pendency of the litigation:  teaching Tamils to apply for ―tsunami-
related relief‖ and helping LTTE to negotiate a peace settlement). 
101
  Supra note 92 at 12. 
102
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2714 
(2010). 
103
  Id. 
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conduct which would benefit the terrorist in terrorist 
activities. 
The government supported its argument with legislative 
history.  Congress had found that material support would 
include any support, humanitarian, political or financial, 
which would free up other resources that terrorists could then 
use for unlawful purposes.  Congress specifically recognized 
that Foreign Terrorist Organizations, those designated by the 
government as DFTOs, ―are so tainted by their criminal 
conduct that any contribution to . . . [the] organization 
facilitates that [criminal] conduct.‖
104
   
Solicitor General Elana Kagan stressed the importance of 
these findings at oral argument telling Justice Breyer, 
―Congress is the reasonable person here.  And Congress 
reasonably decided that when you help a terrorist - foreign 
terrorist organization‘s legal activities, you are also helping 
the foreign terrorist organization‘s illegal activities.‖
105
   She 
further insisted, ―Congress made findings about the 
fungibility of these resources.  Congress said over and over 
that these organizations [DFTOs] have no firewalls, no 
organizational firewalls, no financial firewalls.‖
106
  When 
Justice Ginsburg insisted that the humanitarian groups only 
wanted to ―train [the PKK and LTTE] how to do lawful 
things, how to pursue their goals in a lawful, rather than 
terrorist way,‖
107
  Kagan responded that Congress had 
specifically prohibited ―the provision of actual support:  
Services to the organizations that the organization can use in 
its activities, both legal and illegal.‖
108
  The same argument 
was made in an amici brief filed by persons involved in 
fighting terrorism who noted that ―Congress had fashioned [a 
comprehensive scheme] over a period of years to address the 
complex problem of transnational terrorism‖
109
 realizing that 
                                                          
104
  AEDPA Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 301 (a) 7, 110 Stat. 1214, 1247. 
105
  Oral Argument, at 39, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318. 
106
  Id. at 42:5-8. 
107
  Id. at 45:10-11. 
108
  Oral Argument, 45:24-25, 46:1-2. 
109
  Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public 
Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues in Support of 
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DFTOs use ―putatively nonviolent programs to enhance 
incentives for terrorist activity.‖
110
   Counsel David D. Cole 
representing HLP, however, responding to Justice 
Sotomayor‘s question about money being fungible for 
terrorist groups,
111
  noted that HLP, et al‘s goals had ―nothing 
to do with money.‖
112
   
 Justice Roberts relied heavily on the fungibility 
arguments espoused by the government and amici and the 
fact that Congress had made specific findings about the 
fungibility of various kinds of aid given to the legal and 
legitimate activities of the terrorist organization.  He very 
meticulously rejected plaintiff‘s argument that, because the 
projected support to PKK and LTTE would only further the 
peaceful goals of the two organizations, HLP, et al activities 
should not be restricted.  The Court looked to both 
Congressional findings
113
 and Executive conclusions
114
 to 
support its position on the fungibility of material support.   
Congress found that ―foreign organizations that engage in 
terrorist activity are so tainted by the criminal conduct that 
any contribution to such an organization facilitates that 
conduct.‖
115
  Roberts also noted that the State Department 
strongly supported the congressional finding that ―all 
contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their 
terrorism.‖
116
  In the Executive‘s view,  ―Given the purposes, 
organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign 
terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any material 
support . . . will ultimately enure to the benefit of their 
                                                                                                                       
Petitioners, at p. 8, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 
(2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 5070069. 
110
  Id. at *12. 
111
  Oral Argument, 61:16-20, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318. 
112
  Id. at 62:10-11. 
113
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726 
(2010). 
114
  Id. at 2727. 
115
  Id. at 2724 (quoting from AEDPA §§ 301 (a)(1)-(7), 110 Stat. 
1247, note following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose) 
(emphasis added by the Court)). 
116
  Id. at 2727. 
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criminal, terrorist functions - regardless of . . . [intent] to 
support non-violent non-terrorist activities.‖
117
   
 The majority noted that the national security interest in 
the case included ―national defense, foreign relations, or 
economic interests of the United States.‖
118
  Stressing the 
foreign relations component, the majority found that material 
support ―in any form also furthers terrorism by straining 
United States‘ relationships with its allies and undermining 
cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist 
attacks.‖
119
  The majority recognized that both the PKK and 
LTTE are insurgency groups at war with internationally 
recognized nations with whom the United States must deal as 
independent sovereigns in a global effort to combat terrorism.  
Chief Justice Roberts specifically mentioned Turkey, a 
NATO ally, as a nation with whom relations might be 
compromised when material support to its declared enemy is 
given by Americans and related non-profit organizations.
120
  
 The majority also accepted the government‘s argument 
that HLP, et al‘s projected activities would lend legitimacy to 
the DFTOs
121
 and undermine United States‘ efforts to 
delegitimize and weaken terrorist groups.  Justice Breyer, 
dissenting, rejected the legitimacy rationale as ultimately 
detrimental to First Amendment protections.
122
  He 
characterized the arguments as antithetical to the First 
Amendment support of the deliberative process, fearing that 
the concept ―would deny First Amendment protection to the 
peaceful teaching of international human rights law on the 
                                                          
117
  Id. at 2727 (quoting McKune Affidavit, App. 133 ¶ 8). 
118
  Id. at 2713 (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (d)(2) as legislation 
giving the Secretary of State authority to designate Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations). 
119
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726 
(2010). 
120
  Id. 
121
  Id. at 2725-26.  The group would be contributing material support 
that would ―help lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups-legitimacy 
that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to 
raise funds-all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.‖ See also Brief 
for the Respondents at 56, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 
2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 4951303. 
122
  Id. at 2736. 
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ground that a little knowledge about ‗the international legal 
system‘ is too dangerous a thing.‖
123
  
 The government argued that, because the statute only 
regulated conduct, the ―vast majority of its applications do 
not even . . . implicate the First Amendment.‖
124
  The 
Solicitor General explained that the material-support statute 
does not prohibit independent advocacy and insisted that the 
association clause does not give American citizens the right 
to ―deal in whatever way they wish with foreign nations . . . 
or foreign organizations.‖
125
    
 Counsel David Cole forcefully asserted his clients‘ rights 
to give peacetime assistance to further peaceful goals, an 
activity protected by the Constitution.  He distinguished HLP, 
et al.‘s proposed activities from acts of treason which are 
punishable as a crime under the Constitution.   He argued that 
treason, which involved giving aid to the enemy, ―c[ould] be 
in the form of speech‖ but that prosecution for treason 
required proof of specific intent to betray the United States.
126
  
His clients, to be guilty of a crime, would necessarily have to 
have the mens rea associated with the crime, i.e. the intent to 
further terrorist activity.  Cole insisted that the PKK and 
LTTE are separatist groups with whom the United States is 
not at war, and that his clients‘ speech-related activity had 
nothing to do with terrorism.  
 Chief Justice Roberts, for the majority, rejected the 
proposition that a specific intent requirement should be read 
into the statute for culpability to attach.  He noted, ―We reject 
plaintiff‘s interpretation of §2339(B) because it is 
inconsistent with the text of the statute.‖
127
  The statute 
specifically prohibits ―knowingly providing material support. 
. .a person [to violate the statute] must have knowledge that 
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . has 
                                                          
123
  Id. at 2738.  
124
  Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 2599311. 
125
  Oral Argument at 34, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318. 
126
  Id. at 23-24. 
127
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2717 
(2010). 
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engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . Congress . . . 
chose knowledge about the organization‘s connection to 




 Justice Breyer, writing for Justices Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg, accepted HLP, et al‘s invitation to avoid deciding 
the First Amendment issue by reading the knowledge 
requirement as specific intent to further the terrorist aims of 
the organization.  Such a reading necessitated remanding the 
case for proof of such intent. 
 
I believe that a construction that would avoid 
the constitutional problem is ‗fairly 
possible.‘… I would read the statute as 
criminalizing First-Amendment-protected pure 
speech and association only when the 
defendant knows or intends that those 





Accordingly, Breyer set up a four part test.  
The defendant would have to know or intend: 
(1) that he is providing support or resources, 
(2) that he is providing that support to a 
foreign terrorist organization, and (3) that he 
is providing support that is material, meaning 
(4) that his support bears a significant 





 Breyer reasoned that such an interpretation is ―consistent 
with the statutes text . . . [and] with Congress‘ basic intent . . 
.‖
131
  Breyer‘s textual analysis differs markedly from the 
analysis by Chief Justice Roberts who relied on the precise 
words used by Congress in context with the degree of 
                                                          
128
  Id. 
129
  Id. at 2740. 
130
  Id. at 2740-41. 
131
  Id. at 2742. 
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knowledge required in other sections of the Act, as well as 
the legislative intent expressed by Congress when passing the 
provision.  Breyer, to find the specific intent requirement, 
relied primarily on Congress‘ expressed intent that the statute 
was not to interfere with First Amendment free speech and 
association.   
Breyer also discredits the fungibility argument and the 
legislative history supporting it.  He finds the evidence as too 
general and non-specific to be credited. 
 
The most that one can say in the government‘s 
favor is that [the legislative history] might be 
read as offering highly general support for the 
argument.  The statements do not, however, 
explain in any detail how the plaintiff‘s 
political-advocacy-related activities might 
actually be ‗fungible‘ and therefore capable of 




 The majority interprets the communication urged by HLP, 
et al not as speech, but as conduct which uses speech.  Chief 
Justice Roberts points out that direct advocacy which would 
implicate First Amendment concerns is not proscribed by the 
statute.  Humanitarian organizations can freely speak - but 
cannot give ―material support‖ to DFTOs.
133
  
Justice Breyer, however, regarded the communication and 
association urged by HLP, et al as pure political speech 
entitled to the highest constitutional protection.  Attorney 
Cole, at oral argument during rebuttal, pointed out that ―[t]he 
government has spent a decade arguing that our clients 
cannot advocate for peace, cannot inform about international 
human rights.‖
134
  This theme would dominate Justice 
Breyer‘s dissent. After listing the protected speech and 
activities proposed by HLP, et al, he characterized them as 
the ―kind that the First Amendment ordinarily protects.‖
135
  
                                                          
132
  Id. at 2735.  
133
  Id. at 2723-24. 
134
  Oral Argument 59:12-14. 
135
  Supra note 133 at 2732. 
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He insisted that the court should remand the case and require 
the government to present ―specific evidence, rather than 
general assertion‖ to prove that the statute requirements are 
the least restrictive means possible to accomplish the 
compelling government national security purpose.
136
 
 Both opinions appropriate prudential doctrines of judicial 
restraint.  The majority decides narrowly as an applied pre-
prosecution request for declaratory judgment by relying 
heavily on the presumption that the legislative act is 
constitutional; by noting that the act was regularly passed and 
meticulously amended to provide clarity; by refusing to read 
beyond the text and legislative history; by applying plain 
meaning to the words used; by refusing to disregard the plain 
meaning of the words to find what Justice Breyer terms 
―actual intent.‖  The minority appropriates the prudential 
maxim of not deciding the constitutional issue if is ‟fairly 
possible‖ to resolve the dispute another way, i.e. the canon of 
constitutional avoidance urged by HLP, et al.  This the 
minority does by interpretation, construing the statute to 
require ―specific intent to further the [DFTO‘s] unlawful 
ends‖ coupled with a likelihood that the harm would result.
137
 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer both agreed that 
the material-support requirements were not unconstitutionally 
vague.  The application of the requirements marked the point 
of disagreement.  The majority reviewed the proposed 
activities of HLP, et al and found that the organization would 
be punished for contravening the act, accepting essentially 
the government‘s arguments.  The minority required more 
proof that the activities were proscribed by the act, effectively 
accepting HLP, et al‘s arguments, and remanding for 
                                                          
136
  Id. at 2742. 
137
  Id. at 2740.  See also Brief for Academic Researchers and the 
Citizens Media Law Project as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents/Cross-Petitioners at 25, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 4271309. 
They argued for free speech and transparency, reasoning the ―[t]he 
requirement of specific intent is particularly important where individuals 
seek to associate in some manner with groups (like those at issue in this 
case . . .) that engage in both lawful and unlawful activity.‖  
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evidence of specific intent to further the terrorists‘ unlawful 
activity.  
Although the government argued for application of the 
O‘Brien intermediate standard of review,
138
 the majority 
rejected that standard and applied strict scrutiny.  The 
minority agreed that the stricter standard of review was 
necessary.  The Court specifically rejected the O‘Brien 
standard of review, but both cases present strikingly similar 
scenarios.  In O‘Brien, the government‘s interest in national 
security prompted the government‘s comprehensive selective 
service program with the requirement that draft cards remain 
intact.  O‘Brien, to protest the Viet Nam War, destroyed his 
draft card.  The O‘Brien court construed the activity, not as 
political speech, but as an act which would thwart or disrupt 
the operation of the selective service program, and thereby 
negatively impact national security.  O‘Brien‘s conviction 
was upheld.  In HLP, et al, the government‘s interest in 
national security prompted the government comprehensive 
provisions to identify foreign terrorist organizations through 
the DFTO program and to prevent third parties from giving 
the organizations material support.  HLP, et al, to further 
their humanitarian outreach to political insurgents, would 
counsel DFTOs in nonviolent methods to achieve their 
political ends.  The majority characterized HLP, et al‘s 
activities not as political or ―pure‖ speech but as activities 
that were specifically proscribed by the Patriot Act‘s material 
support provisions. 
Urging the Court to adopt the lower O‘Brien standard of 
review, the government had argued that ―the statute at issue 
here regulates conduct, divorced from any relation to the 
content of expression.‖
139
  The majority, however, rejected 
the proposition that the statute regulated conduct without any 
relation to speech.  Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the 
                                                          
138
  See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 2599311, 
for the government argument that because the statute ―regulates conduct 
and only incidentally restricts speech . . . the statute is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968).‖ 
139
  Id. at 11. 
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cases and found that the heightened level of scrutiny was 
necessary in HLP, et al, because speech was intricately 
involved in HLP, et al‘s projected activities, and i.e. the 
humanitarian organizations intended to use speech to 
accomplish humanitarian goals. In O‘Brien, the regulation 
was content neutral, draft cards were not to be destroyed for 
any reason.  Recognizing that the O‘Brien test applied only to 
content neutral regulations,
140
 the majority noted that §2339B 
―regulates speech on the basis of its content,‖ the ―[p]laintiffs 
want to speak to the PKK and the LTTE, and whether they 
may do so under §2339B depends on what they say.‖
141
 Both 
the majority and the minority opinions rejected the O‘Brien 
test. Justice Breyer reasoned that the stricter standard of 
review was necessary because he characterized HLP, et al‘s 
projected activities as political or ―pure‖ speech which is 
always protected under a properly applied strict scrutiny 
standard. 
The majority and the dissent agree on the level of scrutiny 
required to review the material support provisions of the 
Patriot Act and on some other issues: the justiciability of 
H.L.P. et al‘s pre-enforcement claim,
142
 the fact that the 
government has a compelling national security interest, and 
the fact that the four types of support proscribed by the Act 
are not unconstitutionally vague, but enforceable.
143
   
                                                          
140
  See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2723 (quoting Chief 
Justice Roberts, that the intermediate scrutiny test provides that ―content 
neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it 
advances important government interests unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary 
to further those goals.‖).   
141
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2723 
(2010). 
142
  Id. at 2717.  The Court found the case was justiciable because the 
plaintiffs faced ―‗a credible threat of prosecution‘ and ‗should not be 
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of 
seeking relief.‘‖ Quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979) and Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-129 
(2007). 
143
  Id. at 2719-20 n.6 (applying the test for vagueness as stated in 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008), ―. . .whether the 
statute ‗provide[s] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited.‘‖).  See id. at 2731, for Justice Breyer's dissent, ―Like the 
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However, the opinions differ substantially in framing the 
issue before them.  The majority defines the issue as whether 
the government may prohibit what Plaintiffs want to do - 
provide material support to the PKK and LTTE in the form of 
speech.
144
  The dissent frames the issue as whether the 
government has ―met its burden of showing that an 
interpretation of the statute that would prohibit this speech- 
and association- related activity serves the Government‘s 
compelling interest in combating terrorism.‖
145
  Or, as 
restated, whether the Government has proved under the strict 
scrutiny standard of review that the specific speech and 
associated-related activity proposed by H.L.P. et al falls 
within the scope of material support proscribed by §2339B.  
Highlighting the current tone of incivility in Supreme 
Court opinions, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer 
disparage the other‘s opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts 
dismisses the dissent‘s analysis of the prohibited speech as 
limited and unfounded,
146
 faults the dissent for ignoring 
common sense and the evidence presented by the 
government,
147
  for adopting the mental state requirement by 
ignoring Congress‘ express rejection of the requirement,
148
 
for requiring hard evidence of intent from the Government, a 
―dangerous requirement,‖
149
 for giving insufficient weight to 
the Executive and Congressional findings and substituting its 
―own evaluation of the evidence for a reasonable evaluation 
by the Legislative Branch,‖
150
 for failing to address the ―real 
dangers at stake‖ by living in a different ―dissent‘s world‖ 
                                                                                                                       
Court, and substantially for the reasons it gives, I do not think the statute 
is unconstitutionally vague.‖  
144
  See id. at 2724 n.10. 
145
  Id. at 2731. 
146
  See id. at 2723 n.4. 
147
  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726 
n.6 (2010).  
148
  See id. at 2718 n.3. 
149
  Id. at 2727-28.  
150
  Id. at 2727.  C.J. Roberts, quoting from Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 
U.S. 57, 68 (1981), emphasizing also the fact that Congress‘ ability to 
collect evidence and draw factual inferences is superior to the Court‘s -- 
―‗. . .the lack of competence on the part of the court is marked.‘‖  Id. at 
65. 
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heedless of the congressional and executive conclusion that 
―we live in a different world.‖
151
  Justice Breyer faults the 
majority for its ―development of the Government themes‖ on 
mere speculation,
152
  for stretching the concept of fungibility 
beyond constitutional limits,
153
 for ―assuming‖ without hard 
evidence that ―those who are taught will put otherwise 
innocent speech or knowledge to bad use . . .,‖
154
 for adopting 
a rule which ―would automatically forbid the teaching of any 
subject in a case where national security interests conflict 
with the First Amendment,‖
155
 for misunderstanding the word 
―relief‖ by not restricting it to mean only monetary relief and 
for ignoring plaintiff counsel‘s denial at oral argument that 
HLP, et al do not intend to offer monetary relief to the 
DFTOs,
156
  for reading too broadly Congress‘ ―informed 
judgment‖ to included the proposed activity,
157
 for not 
requiring specific proof of fungibility but relying on 
generalities and speculation,
158
 for ―sacrific[ing] First 
Amendment protection for… speculative gain,‖
159
 for being 
―wrong about the lack of specificity‖ of the plaintiff‘s 
advocacy claims,
160
 for not remanding for factual 
determination under a ―proper standard of review,‖
161
 for 
failing to ―examine the Government‘s justifications with 
sufficient care,‖
162
 for failing to require specific evidence and 
―tailoring of means to fit compelling ends.‖
163
   
                                                          
151
  Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2729. 
152
  Id. at 2737 et seq. 
153
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2738 
(2010).  
154
  Id. at 2738. 
155
  Id. 
156
  Id. at 2738-2739. 
157
  Id. at 2739. 
158
  Id. at 2735. 
159
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2739 
(2010) (quoting from Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic 
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973)). 
160
  Id. at 2743. 
161
  Id. 
162
  Id. 
163
  Id.  
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How do the opinions expressed in HLP, et al contribute to 
the search for a remedial paradigm?  Both sides of the 
argument were fully presented and the discussion enriched.  
Although reasonable judicial minds differed on the effect and 
the scope of the government regulation, the immediate result 
is that the Congressional material-support statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague and no specific intent to further the 
unlawful ends of the terrorist organization is required to 
prove a violation. The specific activity proposed by HLP, et 
al is proscribed by §2339B.  Although application of the 
material-support prohibitions to the plaintiffs‘ proposed 
activities survived strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, 
future applications may not pass constitutional muster as the 
majority warned.
164
  Independent speech, speech not 
coordinated with a DFTO, remains untouched by the opinion, 
which indicates that future as applied challenges to the statute 
will continue.  Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the narrow 
holding did not reach domestic terrorist groups and found 
only that ―in prohibiting the particular forms of support that 
plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist groups, §2339 
does not violate the freedom of speech.‖
165
 
The ultimate significance of the ruling awaits future 
assessment, but the continuing dialogue between the 
governmental branches is expected to accelerate.  Free speech 
advocates claim that the case is another example of 
overreaction during a time of crisis.  Initial response to the 
holding was predictable.  Those who think that the 
Constitution speaks with one voice during times of crisis as 
well as in times of peace find the opinion unsettling.
166
  The 
reaction of Kay Guinane and Suraj K. Sazawai is 
representative.
167
  Calling the decision a ―stunningly 
                                                          
164
  Id. at 2730. 
165
  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2730 
(2010).  
166
  See Supreme Court‘s Humanitarian Law Project Ruling Fails the 
Common Sense Test, June 29, 2010, available at 
www.charityandsecurity.org.  
167
  Id. (Writing for the Charities and Society Network which Kay 
Guinane and other non-profit interest groups established in 2008 to 
respond to counter-terrorism activity perceived to impede unnecessarily 
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nonsensical result‖ which showed an ―extraordinary level of 
deference to Congress and the administration in matters of 
national security,‖ the authors noted that Congress and the 
President must now take responsibility to ―review current 
policies and make some changes‖ and predicted that 
Congress ―will find that in most instances, allowing U.S. 
conflict mediators, peacebuilders and humanitarian aid 
workers to do their work weakens terrorist groups.‖
168
  
Similarly, a group represented by David Cole,
169
 which 
earlier called for reforms to the material support law, will 
presumably continue to work for reform.
170
   Obviously, 
those who adhere to Cicero‘s adage inter arma silent leges, 
and those who stress the immediate need to protect national 
security find the result laudable.
171
 
                                                                                                                       
and detrimentally the work of charitable organizations.  The group, a 
project of OMB Watch, is headquartered at 1400 16th St. NW, Suite 210, 
in Washington, D.C.).  
168
  Id. 
169
  David Cole, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center, and David Keene, Chairman, American Conservative Union, co-
chaired the Constitution Project‘s Liberty and Security Committee which 
recommended reforms on Nov. 17, 2009.  See Reforming the Material 
Support Laws:  Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prohibitions on 
Material Support to ―Terrorist Organizations,‖   available at 
www.constitutionproject.org.  The Committee made eight 
recommendations for reform.  The first recommendation calling for 
amending the definition of material support to require intent to further 
illegal conduct is even more important given that the argument to the 
judiciary failed in HLP, et al.   The report also calls for Congress to 
amend the categories of support to exempt additional examples of 
humanitarian aid, info@constitutionproject.org. 
170
  David Cole analyzed the Supreme Court decision, noting that the 
Supreme Court ruled, for ―the first time in its history that speech 
advocating only lawful non-violent activity can be subject to criminal 
penalty,‖ and concluded that the Court ―appear[s] to be repeating history 
rather than learning from it.‖ David Cole, the Roberts Court vs. Free 
Speech: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, a case decided by the 
Supreme Court, June 24, 2010, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 19, 
2010. 
171
  See generally, Paul Rosenzweig, Yes, Virginia, Supporting 
Terrorists IS a Crime (June 21, 2010), Protect America, Rule of Law, at 
blog.heritage.org/2010/06/21/yes-virginia-supporting-terrorists-is-a-
crime.  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Each of these three areas of litigation exemplifies an 
unending search to find the remedial paradigm that will 
effectively combat and prevent terrorism.  The paradigms are 
neither comprehensive nor mutually exclusive.  The 
solutions, and others that have been offered, reflect different 
approaches to solving terrorism issues.  Academics are 
divided over whether the remedial paradigm should be part of 
a war strategy
172
 or a criminal strategy
173
 or a combination of 
the two.
174
  Others have found both strategies to be 
inadequate or deficient and have offered different 
solutions.
175
  The necessity to combat terrorism continues as 
does the effort to find a remedial paradigm. 
                                                          
172
  See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2047 (2005) (for authors‘ contention that the war on terrorism is a 
―real war.‖ Although ―there are indeed differences between this conflict 
and more traditional interstate conflicts . . .,‖ the authors conclude that 
―Congress has authorized the President to fully prosecute a war against 
the entities covered by the [Authorization for Use of Military Force]).‖  
173
  See Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11:  Attacks 
on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 325, 326-27 (2003) Paust argues 
that the ―United States simply cannot be at war with bin Laden and al 
Queda as such . . . .‖ The laws of war should be left intact and not 
changed to encompass a ―war on terror,‖ but other ―international laws 
involving criminal responsibility and universal jurisdiction, including 
crimes against humanity . . .‖ do apply to acts of terror. 
174
  See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL‘Y 457, 479, 485 (2002) Professor Feldman suggests that 
the ―war/crime distinction‖ may ―break down‖ in the case of international 
terrorism . . .‖ and that a pragmatic, flexible approach which blurs the 
distinction may be appropriate to protect ―republicanism. 
175
  Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 
1029 (2004).  Professor Ackerman, after concluding that neither the law 
of war nor the law of crime can deal with acts of terrorism, has 
―design[ed] a constitutional framework for a temporary state of 
emergency.‖  Id. at 1037; see generally 1032-37.  His model includes a 
limited role for the judiciary, as the solution ―simply cannot afford the 
time needed for serious judicial review.‖ Id. at 1066.  He calls not for a 
constitutional amendment, but a legislative framework statute which 
would deal with terrorism on a state of emergency basis, using the 
techniques that ―impose constitutional order on new and unruly realities 
that were unforeseen by the Founders.‖ Id. at 1077.                                         
